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Introduction 40
It is widely recognized that stemming the decline of biodiversity requires a greater focus on 41 conservation efforts targeting private land. With private land covering a large part of the 42 terrestrial landmass and supporting important biodiversity, its significance for conservation is 43 gaining prominence in many countries, including Australia, Canada, the USA, New Zealand, Chile 44 and South Africa (Langholz & stewardship programs to conserve habitat (Platt & Ahern 1995) , and the extent to which 50 conservation easement programs contribute to reducing development pressure and 51 maintaining biodiversity (Pocewicz et al. 2011) . Studies have also looked at the degree to which 52 private land conservation aligns with strategic conservation goals Adams 53 et al. 2014 ). Yet important questions still remain about the effectiveness and long-term 54 consequences of private land conservation mechanisms (Merenlender et al. 2004) . 55
Of growing importance in private land conservation policy is the establishment of Private 56
Protected Areas (PPAs) -a protected area, as defined by the IUCN (Dudley 2008) , under private 57 governance (Stolton et al. 2014 ). PPAs are established in different ways in different countries, 58 and the mechanisms used to protect biodiversity through legal or other effective means also 59 vary. Here, we investigate two components central to private land conservation policy; the 60 permanence (duration) and security (resistance to removal) of conservation agreements with 61 landholders, focusing on conservation covenants as one form of PPA. We focus on examining 62 these issues in Australia, which has a large number of individual conservation covenants 63 (Stolton et al. 2014; Fitzsimons 2015) . We first provide background information on our case 64 study and the challenges around permanence and security for policy-makers, before presenting 65 our results and using them as context to highlight the central role that monitoring and reporting 66 of covenant releases and breaches plays in ensuring the long-term effectiveness of these 67 agreements. 68
Private land conservation in Australia 69 As in many countries, conservation policy in Australia has historically focused on public land 70 Australian covenants are backed by specific enabling legislation (Fitzsimons 2015) , specifying 91 the body authorized to administer the covenant, typically a statutory authority. 92
Since the creation of the first conservation covenant in Australia, a Wildlife Refuge in New South 93 Wales in 1951 (DECCW 2010), the number of covenants has grown considerably to 7,491 in 94 2014 ( Figure 1 ). This includes 4,894 covenants likely to meet the private protected area criteria 95 in Australia which require the area to be valuable, secure through statutory provisions, well-96 managed for conservation, and clearly defined (see Fitzsimons 2015) . With the number of 97 covenants set to grow further, it is important to evaluate their permanence as a conservation 98 mechanism. 99 title and lasting in perpetuity, they are commonly considered the most permanent private land 111 conservation mechanism in Australia. Thus they are formally able be classified as protected 112 areas and can contribute to Australia's international protection targets (Fitzsimons 2006 (Fitzsimons , 2015 . 113
Related to permanence is an agreement's strength (its 'security'), which refers to the level of 114 authority required to establish, alter and/or terminate or extinguish ('release') that agreement 115 (Fitzsimons 2006) . Although security provisions vary between programs, all covenants in 116 Australia are backed by legislation (Fitzsimons 2015) , with release usually requiring approval 117 from multiple parties including a government Minister. The exception is the Wildlife Refuge 118 program, which is only available in the state of New South Wales and is unique amongst 119
Australian covenants for only requiring approval for release from a single party (e.g. the Little information exists on the permanence and security of PPAs in Australia. Here, for the first 150 time, we collate and examine the available data on covenants from all major Australian 151 covenanting programs (Table 1) 
Methods

158
Between October 2013 and January 2014, we asked individuals within the 13 major Australian 159 covenanting organizations who were familiar with and had access to database records to 160 provide the numbers of and reasons for covenant releases and breaches. We followed up 161 responses with further questioning where needed. The programs involved cover all states and 162 territories (with the exception of the Australian Capital Territory; Table 1 ). 163 Table 1 here) 164 Database records varied across organizations and programs -both in the detail (e.g. the type of 165 impact caused the breach) and the style of recording (i.e. hard copy or electronic). Detailed 166 information was not always available due to confidentiality, limited record-keeping, or the 167 difficulty of retrieving data when resourcing restrictions precluded their ability to sift through 168 hard copy records. Where only limited data was available, we asked program staff to instead 169 provided estimates. The type of information provided by staff clearly fell into two categories: 1) 170 'minimum bound estimates', where staff provided the known cases but indicated that the true 171 number was likely greater but unknown; 2) 'rough estimates', where staff were unsure of actual 172 cases and could only provide a rough estimate. The description of the activities behind the 173 covenant release and breach data were used to categorize these into common themes. 174 175 We considered covenants 'released' if they had been signed over a particular piece of land in the 176 past but had subsequently been removed from the land title (i.e. the covenant had been 177 terminated in accordance with the relevant security provisions). Because obligations vary 178 between programs, we considered a covenant 'breached' if its obligations had not been met, but 179 the covenant had remained in place. We did not count third party damage (e.g. by neighbors) as 180 a landholder breach, but recorded this information separately, as we consider this type of 181 damage reasonably beyond the immediate control of the landholder and the administering 182 body. 183
Covenant releases and breaches
Results
184
Covenant releases 185 The single-party NSW Wildlife Refuge covenants had by far the highest number of releases, 186 although this was based on the estimate provided by program staff (130 out of 673). A total of 187 eight out of 6,818 multi-party covenants (0.12%) had been released across Australia, with 188 Victoria (4) and Western Australia (3) having the highest numbers of releases (Table 2) . 189 Table 2 here)
190
For multi-party covenants, the reasons for release varied considerably, ranging from 191 unauthorized timber removal to government acquisition or administrative error ( Some 43 of the 71 breaches (60%) had insufficient information for classification (Table 4) . Of 207 those able to be categorized, as a percentage of all reported breaches, most arose from land 208 clearing and/or development (13%), road construction (7%), forestry operations (7%) or 209 unauthorized timber removal (7%). Some 25% of all breaches were attributed to a third party. 210
In one third party breach, forestry contractors working on a neighboring property cleared 211 vegetation on a covenanted property where the boundary delineation was unclear; in another 212 case, a third party had gained illegal entry to the property and collected firewood. 213 (insert The importance of strong security provisions 216 Using Private Protected Areas (PPAs) to conserve biodiversity is a growing approach in 217 conservation policy. By definition, PPAs require protection through legal or other effective 218 means (Stolton et al. 2014) , and by extension, their effectiveness as a permanent conservation 219 mechanism relates directly to the ease in which that agreement can be released, amended or 220 enforced. 221
Focusing on Australian covenants as a form of PPA, our case study found only a small number of 222 multi-party covenants had been released, suggesting they are a conservation mechanism with 223 high permanence. Moreover, our study also highlights a clear distinction in the proportion of 224 releases between covenants with differing security provisions, with a relatively high proportion 225 of single-party Wildlife Refuge releases (19%) compared with multi-party covenants (0.12%). 226
Considering the extent of legal challenges that permanent agreements face (Rissman & Butsic 227 2011) and are likely to face in the future, this is a clear demonstration to policy-makers of the 228 value of strong security provisions, whereby requiring authorization from multiple parties 229 reduces the potential for release, and contributes towards ensuring these agreements meet 230 their promise of in-perpetuity protection (McLaughlin 2007) . We thus emphasize the 231 importance for policy makers to consider and prioritize multi-party provisions to secure their 232 agreements. However, this extra security would have to be weighed up against the potential for 233 these provisions to act as a deterrent to landholders entering the program (Kabii & Horwitz 234 2006) . 235
Preparing for threats to agreements 236 Whilst strong security provisions may help prevent release, the early identification of threats to 237 these agreements could help policy-makers prepare and adapt to emerging issues. Part of this 238 requires understanding the reasons why covenants are being released. The data analyzed in our 239 study showed no standout cause for multi-party covenant release and instead, each appears a 240 product of individual circumstances. However, in the single party Wildlife Refuges program, the 241 higher number of releases was attributed to landholders opting to withdraw. Further research 242 is needed to understand why landholders are leaving the program, for example by investigating 243 landholder commitment and satisfaction with the covenanting program (e.g. Selinske et al. 244 2015) . 245
Beyond release, some breaches of obligations are a potential threat to the permanence of 246 agreements, through damage to ecological values of the property which may in some extreme 247 cases cause major loss in values, leading to covenant release. It is possible that the reasons 248 behind breaches may be similar to releases, providing room for organizations to intervene early 249 to prevent release. In our study, of those breaches with sufficient information, land clearing 250 showed up as the biggest issue. Due to the limited available data, the extent of this issue is 251 unclear, as are the reasons for clearing, but it highlights one of the key challenges for policy 252 makers -how to minimize unwanted landholder behavior from a distance with minimal 253 intervention. One approach could be for private land organizations to increase the level of 254 enforcement and consider strengthening the compliance components within the legal 255 agreement if needed (see Jay 2013). However, maintaining a strong and constructive 256 relationship with landholders could help prevent the substantial costs associated with 257 enforcement (Rissman & Butsic 2011) and as a preventative measure, an increased focus on 258 landholder support may help clarify landholder understanding of their obligations (Stroman & 259 Kreuter 2014) and help uncover the reasons behind this clearing. 260
In response to breaches, a number of organizations mentioned covenant amendment as a 261 preferred method of resolution to release, provided the property's ecological values remained 262 protected. This fits with the findings of Rissman (2010), who noted that land trusts in the USA 263 have an incentive to act moderately when obligations are not met. We did not look directly at 264 amendments, and the data available from our study was insufficient to determine how many 265 covenants have been amended, or even the nature of these changes (e.g. renegotiating 266 boundaries or obligations). However, as amendments can relate to the permanence of covenant 267 obligations and the effectiveness of these agreements for use in conservation policy, we 268 highlight the need for programs to monitor and record the nature and extent of any 269 amendments to permanent agreements and suggest this as an important area requiring further 270
research. 271
Some organizations suggested that the turnover of conservation covenants to successor 272 landholders may be developing into a policy issue, which has also been noted elsewhere (Collins 273 Although a significant policy challenge, dealing with current and future owners of protected 283 properties is only one dimension of permanence. Our case study suggests that policy-makers 284 also need to account for actors outside of the direct agreement. Most breaches in our study for 285 which detailed information was available were attributed to damage from a third party (25% of 286 all known breaches). This has also been noted as an issue for easements in the USA (Rissman & 287 Butsic 2011). This raises an important question for policy makers about who holds 288 responsibility for monitoring, preventing and rectifying damage to covenanted properties 289 resulting from trespass, particularly if the third party remains unidentified. Trespass is an issue 290 for conservation areas in general, impacting both the public and private conservation estate. 291
As noted elsewhere, we also agree that the decoupling of above-and below-ground property 292 rights is an important issue for conservation covenants ( A need for improved monitoring and recording 302 It is likely that the growth in permanent conservation agreements will continue, particularly 303 with their increasing use via new pathways such as biodiversity offsets, which are growing in 304 prominence internationally and in all Australian jurisdictions (Bull et al. 2013) . It is possible 305 that this will also lead to an increase in the number of releases and breaches, making effective 306 monitoring of these agreements essential for identifying issues, supporting enforcement 307 308 few releases, detailed breach information was limited, with the number of breaches occurring 309 largely unknown. This is surprising given the prominence of permanence as a key feature of the 310 mechanism, but such fragmented and incomplete data is not unique to covenants, having also 311 been noted before for easements in the USA (Wilson Morris & Rissman 2009 ). 312
The relevant policy questions therefore become where, how and what to monitor? Limited 313 resourcing of covenanting organizations makes monitoring a particular challenge (Fitzsimons & 314 Carr 2014), and organizations may be best to focus their efforts where and when the probability 315 of breach is highest (Czech 2002) . From this study, a starting point may be in areas with known 316 concentrations of successor covenantors or hotspots for third-party trespass. Aerial Our study provides insights into the methodological challenges of multi-jurisdictional studies on 330 conservation agreements. Obtaining sufficient and consistent breach data proved particularly 331 difficult, due largely to organization resourcing constraints on its collection, differences in how 332 breaches are monitored and recorded across organizations (i.e. centrally or regionally, 333 electronically or in hard copy), and privacy concerns over sharing this type of information. 334
There were also challenges in analyzing across different programs (e.g. what constitutes a 335 'breach' under different legislation or landholder agreements). However, our study highlights an 336 opportunity to share data, pool resources and collaborate across organizations to allow for 337 more detailed quantitative and qualitative studies in the future. For this, support is needed from 338 policy-makers for more consistency in covenant monitoring (e.g. LTA 2014), as well as a 339 coordinated approach to recording and sharing breach and release data in ways that address 340 confidentiality concerns. This data should be in digital form in centralized and secure databases, 341 such as the National Conservation Easement Database in the USA (USEFC 2014), with data 342 sharing provisions to allow for comparison across different agreement types, such as US 343 easements and Australian covenants. In Australia, the National Conservation Lands Database 344 (DSWEPaC 2011) has the potential to be an equivalent portal, although its future viability is 345 currently uncertain. 346
As the role of PPAs in protecting biodiversity grows, so does the need to ensure they remain an 347 effective part of the conservation policy toolkit. The numbers of covenant releases and known 348 breaches in our case study were low, suggesting that covenants may be an enduring mechanism 349 for conservation, although we acknowledge the likely under-reporting and minimal data 350 available for breaches. However, ongoing compliance monitoring of covenant breaches and 351 releases will allow policy-makers to respond to issues as they arise, and will also enable future 352 comparison of the permanence of PPAs to the public estate and other protected area categories. 353
This data is key to understanding the permanence and long-term effectiveness of these 354 agreements and crucial for improving the sustainability of conservation policy on private land. data, lighter green and the hollow triangle represents data collected for this study. 501 502 
